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Abstract
The goal of this study is to evaluate the effects of Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility and
programmatic features on transitions from private insurance coverage among samples of
American low-income children using monthly data from the 2001 panel of the Survey of
Income and Program Participation (SIPP), a nationally representative data set. The
estimation approach combines multilevel modeling and event history analysis, including
a robust array of variables measuring programmatic features, individual child, family,
and state attributes. Logistic regression results do not indicate an adverse effect of
expanded Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility on private insurance coverage. Results also
suggest that states which established stand-alone SCHIP programs can potentially limit
crowd-out better than states which simply expanded their existing Medicaid programs
and that waiting periods of less than six months might have a negative impact on private
insurance coverage. Future studies should examine, in greater detail, how program
features and other social policies can reduce crowd-out, while increasing public
insurance take-up rates among the neediest populations.

This project was supported with a grant from the UK Center for Poverty Research through the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation,
grant number 2 U01 PE000002-06. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are solely those of the
author and should not be construed as representing the opinions or policy of the UKCPR or any agency of
the Federal government.

1. INTRODUCTION
The decline in private insurance coverage has been worsened by the economic
slowdown being experienced in the country. Consequently, un-insurance rates have
continued to rise. However, insurance coverage among children is generally higher than
that of adults. This somewhat favorable coverage among children can be linked to
expansions to public insurance programs for children, the latest of which is the State
Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP).
As part of governmental efforts to further expand public insurance for children, in
August 1997, the U.S. Congress created the State Children’s Health Insurance Program
(SCHIP), as Title XXI of the Social Security Act. Title XXI makes provision for children
living in families with income up to 200 percent of the FPL to be eligible for subsidized
health insurance coverage. The legislation further gives states the option to expand
income eligibility limits for subsidized health insurance coverage beyond 200 percent of
poverty (Ku, Ullman, & Almeida, 1999). Some states have even extended such programs
to entire families (The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2004).
Prior studies have shown that earlier Medicaid expansions and the more recent
implementation of SCHIP appeared to achieve significant successes as the proportion of
children with Medicaid coverage increased (Centers for Disease Control & Prevention,
National Center for Health Statistics, 2003; and Bansak & Raphael 2006) and the
proportion of uninsured children living in families whose incomes were between 100 and
200 percent of the FPL declined (Dubay, Hill, & Kenney, 2002).
However, increases in public insurance coverage were accompanied by decreases
in private insurance coverage (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National
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Center for Health Statistics 2003; General Accounting Office, 1997 – now General
Accountability Office; Cunningham, Hadley, & Reschovsky, 2002; Bansak & Raphael
2006; and Sommers et al. 2007). The substitution of public insurance for private
coverage, a phenomenon known as crowd-out, represents a potential unintended effect of
Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility expansion. Crowd-out can occur in several different ways
including when (1) individuals move from private to public coverage as a result of
gaining eligibility through expansions; or (2) privately insured individuals may choose to
become temporarily uninsured with the expectation of gaining access to public insurance
coverage in the near future. The different pathways though which crowd-out occurs
makes it a complex phenomenon, making it difficult to measure empirically.
Other studies have examined relationships between public program design
features and take-up rates of public insurance, especially among low-income individuals.
One such public program design feature that may affect the type of coverage an
individual has is the form (or administrative model) of Medicaid/SCHIP expansion
chosen by a state. Under the legislation that established SCHIP, states have three options
of implementing the program: (1) using SCHIP funds to expand their existing Medicaid
programs, (2) designing a new stand-alone SCHIP program; or (3) combining (1) and (2).
It is important to note that states which created new stand-alone SCHIP programs were
given greater latitude to regulate participation in those stand-alone SCHIP programs. For
example, if a state chooses to expand its Medicaid program, then existing Medicaid rules
apply. States that have new stand-alone SCHIP programs can impose additional rules,
which include enforcing enrollment caps, waiting periods before being enrolled, and
other monitoring mechanisms aimed at curbing the displacement of private insurance.
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These and other differences in programmatic features can potentially affect
Medicaid/SCHIP take-up rates and, by extension, its possible substitution for private
insurance. For example, if a state opts to establish a separate SCHIP program, it may be
more attractive to families because of the stigma associated with traditional Medicaid.
This situation is more likely if the separate SCHIP program has a semblance of some
private insurance plan. In this case, one would expect having a separate SCHIP program
to have a positive effect on the likelihood of participation in public programs, compared
to the stigmatized expanded Medicaid. This a priori expectation will, however, depend
on individual family’s valuation of private insurance, relative to its public options.
Therefore, the effects of new stand-alone SCHIP, relative to expanding existing Medicaid
programs, on participation rates and on private coverage are, a priori, ambiguous.
LoSasso and Buchmueller (2002) included in their regression models a variable
that measured whether a state expanded its existing Medicaid or established a new standalone SCHIP program. The author noted that the inclusion of this program-specific
variable, coupled with additional information, reduced estimates of public insurance
program take-up rates and crowd-out tendencies. Kronebusch and Elbel (2004) also
reported that expansions of existing Medicaid programs have been more successful in
increasing children’s enrollment than stand-alone SCHIP programs. However, the
imposition of certain lengths of waiting periods is said to reduce take-up rates of public
insurance among low-income children (Kronebusch and Elbel 2004; and Bansak and
Raphael 2006).
Given the nature of the private insurance market, one can then posit that any
public insurance program administrative model that tends to increase take-up of public
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insurance is likely to have some negative impact on private insurance coverage by
increasing the odds of transitions from private insurance, if adequate precaution to protect
the latter is not taken. Very few studies have examined the effects of the form (or
administrative model) of Medicaid/SCHIP expansions and mandatory waiting periods on
private insurance coverage. Also, prior studies rarely explicitly analyzed the impact of
these program design features, on a month-to-month basis, to examine transition patterns
of insurance coverage. Since the length of time spent in a given insurance coverage
affects the chances of making transition from one insurance coverage type to another, it is
necessary to employ an analytical framework that incorporates the timing of transition
patterns, one of the contributions being made by this study.
This study takes advantage of the longitudinal nature of the 2001 panel of the
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), combining both event history and
multilevel modeling techniques to examine the effects of public insurance design features
on transitions from private health insurance among low-income U.S. children. The
combined estimation techniques account for the timing of insurance coverage as well as
clustering of children within states both of which are crucial for the study of health
insurance dynamics.
The objectives of this paper are to (a) examine the effects of the form (that is,
administrative models) of Medicaid/SCHIP expansion and waiting periods on transitions
from private insurance coverage; and (b) to investigate whether the post-1996
Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility expansion crowds out private insurance coverage among
sampled low-income children. Econometric models and results are discussed in sections 3

4

and 4, respectively, while section 5 discusses and summarizes study findings as well as
presents conclusions.

2. DATA AND METHODS
I used the 2001 panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP).
The SIPP, conducted by the United States Census Bureau, is a nationally representative
longitudinal survey of civilian, non-institutionalized population of the United States.
The 2001 SIPP panel is part of a longitudinal survey designed for the provision of
detailed information on the economic situation of households and persons in the United
States. The data contain information on the distribution of income, wealth, and poverty
in the U.S. and assess the effects of federal and state programs on the well-being of
families and individuals (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2004). The survey was designed
using a multistage stratified as well as clustered sampling technique.
The interviewed population consists of individuals 15 years or older at the time of the
first interview, excluding persons living in institutions or military barracks. Information
on younger individuals who live with eligible interviewees is also included in the survey.
One-fourth of the sampled households were interviewed each month and households
were re-interviewed at four-month intervals. The 2001 panel consists of 9 interview
periods, referred to as waves of data, with the first wave starting in February 2001 and the
last in January 2004, which produced thirty-six months of data. Finally, topical modules,
a series of supplemental questions on history of employment and program participation,
health and disability, and utilization of health services were appended to the core data
files.
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The Bureau makes available the person-level records with state identifiers for all
fifty states. However, small states such as Maine, Vermont, North Dakota, South Dakota,
and Wyoming do not have unique identifiers. This lack of unique state codes makes it
difficult to measure state-level factors for these small states. Hence these states were not
included in the analyses for this paper. SIPP provides a well-defined sample of lowincome individuals, especially because of the availability of information on monthly
income over the three-year panel life.
Health insurance and other questions covering the preceding four months were
asked at each interview. However, the SIPP data set has what is known as “seam bias”
concerning transitions between insurance coverage. “Seam bias” is said to occur when
there are a disproportionate number of transitions every fourth month because of the
tendency for SIPP respondents to report changes in their insurance status between
interviews instead of between months covered by the interview (Short & Freedman 1998;
Ham & Shore- Sheppard 2000; Doyle, Martin, & Moore 2000; and Card, Hildreth, &
Shore- Sheppard 2001). A commonly used approach to handle the “seam bias” issue is to
analyze inter-wave, that is, every fourth month transitions. However, analyses that
examine inter-wave transitions might lose information on the timing of transitions that
reportedly occurs between months other than the “seam” months (Ham & ShoreSheppard 2000). This study addresses the “seam bias” by making use of monthly
information and also controlling for the “seam” months. Data on the form of program
expansion and waiting periods were retrieved from reports of the Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services. Finally, state employment data, from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics, were appended to the SIPP.
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Analytic Samples
The sample for the study consisted of children aged 19 years and younger living
in low-income families. Low-income children are defined as those with family monthly
incomes below 350 percent of the federal poverty line (FPL). Following Short and Graefe
(2003), a long-term measure of family income as a percentage of the FPL was adopted.
This measure sums monthly family income for each individual over the thirty six months
of the survey. The monthly poverty thresholds that were assigned to each person were
also summed up over the thirty six months. Finally, the summed income was divided by
the summed poverty thresholds to obtain a percentage of the FPL for each person.
Limiting samples to children in families with incomes at or below 350 percent of the FPL
ensured that the analyses made use of samples of children who had at least some
probability of being eligible for Medicaid/SCHIP coverage under the Title XXI
legislation that established SCHIP.
Children included in the sample had at least a male or female family head present.
Using the selection criteria of children’s age and family income, in addition to excluding
children who were identified as married, who reported to have no other insurance but
Medicare, and those who lived in states with no unique identifiers (as described earlier)
produced an analytic sample of 7,994 low-income, unmarried children who were nineteen
years old and younger.
A sub-sample of children having private insurance was then created based on
insurance status in month 9 of the SIPP survey. A child’s insurance coverage in the ninth
month of the survey was considered his/her initial coverage type.
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It should be noted that the information available in the SIPP does not say
categorically whether a person is covered by Medicaid or a separate SCHIP program. It is
possible for respondents who were covered by SCHIP to report it as private coverage. In
order to minimize this likely misclassification of persons into insurance categories, I
assigned Medicaid/SCHIP coverage status to individuals who were reported to be
covered by both private and Medicaid. Nonetheless, there may still be some measurement
error in the insurance variable.
Based on insurance coverage type in month 9, the sample has 4,396 observations
(person-level file) for children who had private. In order to use event history analysis, I
converted the person-level data files into person-months file to analyze transition
patterns. When transformed to person-month files, the private-to-Medicaid/SCHIP data
file has a total of 108,113 person months, while the private-to-uninsured one has 108,584
person months 1 . Also, the full samples were also stratified based on family income of
less than 200 and 200-350 percent of the FPL to examine distributional effects.

Estimation Techniques
I used event history (or duration) analysis and multilevel modeling. The events of
interest for this study are two types of transition in insurance coverage as follows: (1)
private coverage to Medicaid/SCHIP; and (2) private coverage to becoming uninsured.
Since the window of observation in the SIPP data set is not sufficiently wide to identify
the actual starting months of each individual’s health insurance history, it is therefore

1

It should be noted that there are differences in the number of observations (person months) for each pair of
transition models. The different sample sizes represent differences in the number of person months that
made transitions in each data file.
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necessary to define an appropriate starting point of analysis, which is the initial time of an
episode (or spell) being observed, for each event and for each individual.
For this study, based on results of preliminary duration regression analyses,
month 9 of the SIPP was selected to define the initial insurance status of sampled lowincome children. This was done by first identifying the observed beginning of private
health insurance spells, that is, new spells. Then the probability of ending each spell was
modeled as a function of a set of dummy variables that represented the length of spells
and all other covariates in the regression models to be discussed in the next section. The
time-in-spell dummies were measured in four-month intervals, for example, 1-4, 5-8…
33-36, which gave a total of nine dummy variables. The appropriate choice of starting
cross-section would be that interval where the effect of two adjacent dummy variables on
the probability of ending a spell flattens out. That is, the point at which the two adjacent
dichotomous variables are no longer different from each other.
The person-level SIPP data files were then transformed into person-month files,
where spells of private insurance coverage were represented by rows of observations.
Therefore, the unit of analysis is the person month. 2 The transition probabilities from
private insurance coverage to either Medicaid/SCHIP (public) or becoming uninsured
were then estimated using discrete-time logit models, which specified random effects for
the intercepts, the imputed Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility, and the form of program
expansion variables. The two logit models included both time- varying and timeinvariant covariates.

2

Multiple transitions were accounted for in these analyses, because repeated events ensured that maximum
information from every observation was used. Compared with models that allow only a single transition per
person-month, models of repeated events had greater probabilities of an event occurring, and also had
better statistical fit.

9

Further, since children in each state of residence might have state-specific
transition rates, I employed multilevel modeling approach, which corrects for clustering
of children within states and non-constant variance in the error term. In this approach,
children were considered as the level-1 unit of analysis, while states (where they lived),
within which samples of children are clustered, made up the level-2 unit of analysis.

3. ECONOMETRIC MODELS
For each type of insurance spell, empirical models were specified to estimate the
effects of explanatory variables on health insurance transition decisions. Generally, the
discrete-time hazard rate is defined as
Pit = Pr[Ti = t | Ti ≥ t , X it ]

(1)

where T is the discrete random variable that gives the uncensored time of event
occurrence. Equation (1) is the conditional probability that an event occurs at time t, for
individual i, given that the event has not already occurred.
Following Hox (1998), Miller (1998), and Barber, et al. (2000) to illustrate the
estimation of the multilevel regression model, consider some data in which there are two
levels of information: at the individual (or children level) and at the state of residence
level. Let J be the number of states of residence and Nj the number of children (level 1)
in each state (level 2). The dependent variable, which is a level 1 variable, is Yij and the
independent variable Xij, and on level 2, there is the independent variable Zj. Then we
have a separate regression equation in each state of residence, which expresses a child’s
outcome (transitions from private insurance coverage) as the sum of an intercept for the
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child’s state of residence β 0 j , and a random error eij, associated with the ith child in the jth
state as follows:
Yij = β 0 j + β 1 j X ij + eij

where eij~N(0, σ 2 )

(2)

At level 2 (the state level), the Bj are modeled by explanatory variables at the state
B

level:

β 0 j = γ 00 + γ 01 Z j + U 0 j ,

(3)

β 1 j = γ 10 + γ 11 Z j + U 1 j .

(4)

Substituting (3) and (4) into (2) yields the multilevel (mixed) model:
Yij = γ 00 + γ 10 X ij + γ 01 Z j + γ 11 Z j X ij + U 1 j X ij + U 0 j + eij

where γ 00 is the overall (grand) mean

(5)

Specifically, the estimated six discrete-time logistic regressions, which is the
individual-level equation, defined identically for each state, were of the form:

Ln[ Pt ( is ) /(1 − Pt (is ) )] = α is + β is MedSCHIPEl ig t ( is ) + β is OldMedElig t ( is )
+ Bis X t ( is ) + β ks X kt (is ) + ε t ( is )

(6)

The dependent variable in equation (6) represents the logit of the probability of
transitions from private insurance to either Medicaid/SCHIP or becoming uninsured in
time interval t for child i living in state s, given that the child had private coverage at the
beginning of time interval t; α is ( γ 00 in equation 5) is the estimate of the natural log of
the baseline hazard of transition from private coverage during each interval t;
MedSCHIPEligt(is) is the imputed Medicaid/SCHIP (post-1996) eligibility variable for a
child i living in state s, at time t; OldMedEligt(is) is the imputed pre-SCHIP (or pre-1997)
Medicaid eligibility expansion variable for a child i living in state s, at time t; Xt(is)
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represents the matrix of individual and parent/family characteristics in state s and interval
t; and X kt ( is ) represents the matrix of programmatic features such as the form of program
expansion, dummies for waiting periods, and other state-specific variables, which vary
across both states and/or time. The discrete-time hazards specification above gives an
estimate of the baseline hazard of transitions from private health insurance state to either
Medicaid/SCHIP or being uninsured.
Variations in odds of transition across states are estimated by the level-2 equation
below:

β ks = θ ko + θ k1 Z 1s + θ k 2 Z 2 s + ... + θ kq Zqs + μ ks

(7)

The individual/family-level parameters, β , are assumed to vary across states as a
function of state-level characteristics, Zs, as well as the random variations μ s . The level-2
error terms, μ s represent the random effects that model the correlation between the timing
of transitions for children within the same state.
The parameters of the mixed models were estimated by the generalized linear
mixed model (GLIMMIX) estimation technique, using the GLIMMIX macro in SAS
software, which employs a restricted maximum likelihood (REML) procedure.

Dependent Variables
The first step was to identify types of insurance coverage. Mutually exclusive and
exhaustive categories of coverage types are defined as follows: (1) Private, including
military-related coverage; (2) Medicaid/SCHIP coverage; and (3) the uninsured. The
following two transitions, starting in month 9 of the survey, were estimated: (1) private
coverage to Medicaid/SCHIP (public); and (2) private coverage to being uninsured. Each
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spell of reported private coverage defines a dependent variable, which is the conditional
probability of switching from private insurance coverage to either public insurance or
being uninsured when such a transition occurred between months 9 and 36.

Independent variables
All variables are presented and described in Table 1. Explanatory variables
included in specified models are children’s and family demographic characteristics,
Medicaid/SCHIP, and other state-level factors.
The Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility variable was approximated by a dichotomous
variable representing whether or not a child was eligible for Medicaid/SCHIP. Potential
eligibility for the pre-1997 Medicaid eligibility was also imputed by using yearly
eligibility criteria in each state. The eligibility variable incorporates the age of children
and their state of residence; monthly family income; family size-adjusted FPL; and states’
Medicaid/SCHIP upper income thresholds on a month-to-month basis. The approach
used to create this variable is similar to those used by Ham (2000) and Rosenbach, et al.
(2001). The state-specific values of a year’s imputed eligibility variable were then
assigned to every month in that particular year 3 . A dichotomous variable was created for
the third group of sampled children who were not eligible for either pre-SCHIP Medicaid
or post-1996 Medicaid/SCHIP because their family income levels were too high to
qualify for Medicaid/SCHIP. The eligibility variable for the third group of children is the

3

According to the Department of Health and Human Services (2004), re-determination of SCHIP eligibility
occurs every 12 months (a fiscal year) in most states, with the average period of re-determination being
11.7 months. Additional information to impute the public insurance eligibility variable were collected from
the Maternal and Child Health (MCH) updates issued by the National Governors’ Association Center for
Best Practices (1996-2000), the CMS website, individual state’s Medicaid/SCHIP websites, reports from
the National Academy for State Health Policy, and other policy document sources.
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Table 1: Source, Level, Type, and Description of Variables.
Variable

Source/Level

Type

Description

SIPP/Individual

Time-varying
(monthly).

SIPP/Individual

Time-varying
(monthly).

CMS/Program

Time-invariant.

CMS/Program

Time-invariant.

CMS/Program

Time-invariant.

CMS/Program

Time-invariant.

CMS/Program

Time-invariant.

BLS/State
BLS /State

Time-varying
(yearly).
Time-invariant.

CMS/Program

Time-invariant.

Imputed Medicaid/SCHIP variable (1,0) with
1 indicating a child is eligible for the
expansion.
Imputed pre-SCHIP Medicaid variable (1,0)
with 1 indicating a child is eligible for the old
Medicaid.
Binary variable (0,1) with 1 indicating that
state expands eligibility by establishing a
stand alone SCHIP program versus expanding
existing Medicaid program.
Binary variable (0,1) with 1 indicating that
state increases eligibility by both Medicaid
expansion and new SCHIP program versus
expanding existing Medicaid program.
Binary variable (0,1) with 1 indicating that
state imposes a waiting period of one to five
months versus no waiting period.
Binary variable (0,1) with 1 indicating that
state imposes a waiting period of more than
five months versus no waiting period.
Binary variable (0,1) with 1 indicating that
state uses income disregards.
Continuous variable representing state’s unemployment rates.
Continuous variable representing share of
state’s total employments in the retail or
service sector.
Binary variable (0,1) with 1 indicating that
state implemented post-1997 expansion in
1997 versus 1998 or later.

SIPP/Parent

Time-varying
(monthly).
Time-varying
(monthly).
Time-varying
(monthly).

Explanatory variables
CONTEXTUAL
Medicaid/SCHIP*
eligibility
Old Medicaid*
eligibility

Separate SCHIP
program

Mixed expansion
5-month waiting time
or less
Greater than 5-month
waiting time
Income disregards
Unemployment

Retail-service
employment ratio
Medicaid/SCHIP
effective 1997
PARENT/FAMILY
Mom works fulltime
SIPP/Parent
Mom works part-time
SIPP/Parent
Mom works other

Dummy variable (0,1) with 1 indicating that
parent works full-time.
Dummy variable (0,1) with 1 indicating that
parent works part-time.
Dummy variable (0,1) with 1 indicating that
parent works full- or part-time.

Continued on next page
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Table 1: Continued
Variable
PARENT/FAMILY

Source/Level

Type

Description

SIPP / Parent

Time-invariant
(initial value).

SIPP / Parent

Time-invariant
(initial value).

Binary variable (0,1) with 1 indicating
attainment of some schooling but less than a
high school diploma.
Binary variable (0,1) with 1 indicating less
than 4 years of college education.

SIPP / Parent

Time-invariant
(initial value).
Time-invariant
(initial value).
-----/----

Not a high school
graduate
Some college
College graduate
SIPP / Parent
Graduate education
SIPP/Family

Family stability
SIPP/Family
Income-poverty ratio
SIPP/Family
AFDC Receipts
Number of children
under 18

SIPP/Family
SIPP/Family

Resides in Northeast
SIPP/Family
Resides in Midwest
SIPP/Family
Resides in West

Time-varying
(monthly).
Time-varying
(monthly).
Time-varying
(monthly).
Time-varying
(monthly).
Time-varying
(monthly).
Time-varying
(monthly).

Binary variable (0,1) with 1 indicating four
years of college, i.e., a college graduate.
Binary variable (0,1) with 1indicating postgraduate education.
Continuous variable indicating the number of
months, within the window of observation,
during which a child lives in a two-parent
family. Updated monthly.
Continuous variable representing family
income as a %age of FPL
Binary variable (0,1) with 1 indicating AFDC
receipt.
Continuous variable for number of children
under 18 years old in family.
A regional, binary variable (1,0) with 1
indicating residence in the Northeast.
A regional, binary variable (1,0) with 1
indicating residence in the Midwest.
A regional, binary variable (1,0) with 1
indicating residence in the West.

INDIVIDUAL
(CHILD)
SIPP/Individual

Time-varying
(monthly).

Binary variable (0,1) with 1indicating children
aged six years or older versus children less
than six years old.

SIPP/Individual

Time-varying
(monthly).
Time-invariant
(initial value).
Time-invariant
(initial value).
Time-invariant
(initial value).
Time-varying

Binary variable (0,1) with 1 indicating fair or
poor health.
Binary variable (0,1) with 1 indicating African
American.
Binary variable (0,1) with 1 indicating
Hispanic.
Binary variable (0,1) with 1 indicating other
minority racial groups.
Variable to capture “seam effect” in SIPP:
equals 1 every fourth month, 0 otherwise.

Child older than 5
years

Poor health status
SIPP/Individual
Black
SIPP/Individual
Hispanic
SIPP/Individual
Other minority
Seam month

SIPP/Individual

Continued on next page
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Table 1: Continued
Variable
Duration_1-3months

Source/Level

Type

Description

SIPP/Individual

Time-varying

Duration_4-6months

SIPP/Individual

Time-varying

Duration_7-9months

SIPP/Individual

Time-varying

Dummy duration variable (0,1) with 1
indicating between 1-and 3-month long
coverage spell.***
Dummy duration variable (0,1) with 1
indicating between 4-and 6-month long
coverage spell.***
Dummy duration variable (0,1) with 1
indicating between 7-and 9-month long
coverage spell.***

P(t=Ev1|Ev1>=t

SIPP/Individual

Time-varying.

P(t=Ev2|Ev2>=t

SIPP/Individual

Time-varying.

Response variables
Conditional probability of an event
representing transitions from private coverage
to Medicaid/SCHIP coverage.
Conditional probability of an event
representing transitions from private coverage
to being uninsured.

*The reference category is children who are ineligible for public insurance coverage due to too
high family income.

reference (omitted) category. Therefore, the “Medicaid/SCHIP” eligibility, as described
in Table 1 represents the difference between Medicaid/SCHIP-eligible children and those
ineligible due to too high family income levels (denoted as A in Table 2). The “Old
Medicaid eligibility” (denoted as B in Table 2) represents the difference between preSCHIP Medicaid-eligible children and those ineligible due to too high family income
levels. Finally, the differences between A and B, as shown in Table 2, capture the overall
(or net) difference, in transition patterns, between Medicaid/SCHIP-eligible and preSCHIP eligible low-income children. 4

4

Note that groups A and B in Table 2 approximate coefficients of the imputed SCHIP and pre-SCHIP
Medicaid eligibility.
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Table 2: An Illustration of Difference-in-Differences Hypothesis Tests for
Crowd-Out
Model

Private-to-Public
Private-to-uninsured

Medicaid/SCHIP
minus Ineligible
1
A

Old Medicaid
minus Ineligible
2
B

Medicaid/SCHIP minus Old
Medicaid
3
A-B

A

B

A-B

Evaluating the Presence and the Extent of Crowd-Out of Private Insurance by
Medicaid/SCHIP Eligibility Expansion
Crowd-out is defined as the decline in private insurance that is attributable to the
public program relative to the increase in public coverage. Generally, crowd-out is
measured as the proportion of increase in the people enrolled in Medicaid/SCHIP that
would have remained in private coverage in the absence of the Medicaid/SCHIP
expansion (Blumberg, Dubay, & Norton 2000 and LoSasso & Buchmueller 2002).
The coefficient of the variable representing the Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility
approximates the difference between the newly eligible children for the enhanced
Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility, that is, the target group and ineligible children (comparison
group) regarding the likelihood of making transitions from private insurance coverage to
either public coverage or becoming uninsured. According to Blumberg, Dubay, and
Norton (2000), the difference between the newly eligible and ineligible children, while
controlling for measurable factors, is therefore due to the public program expansion.
As discussed in Section 1, crowd-out of private insurance can occur in several ways,
including: (1) individuals move from private to public coverage as a result of gaining
eligibility through expansions; and (2) privately insured individuals may choose to
become temporarily uninsured with the expectation of gaining access to public insurance
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coverage in the near future. Therefore, the following results will be consistent with
crowd-out:
(1) For the model predicting the conditional probability of transitions from private to
public coverage, a statistically significant and positive sign on the coefficient of both
“Medicaid/SCHIP” eligibility and also on the difference between “Medicaid/SCHIP” and
“Old Medicaid” as illustrated in columns 1 and 3, respectively (Table 2); and
(2) For the model of transitions from private coverage to becoming uninsured, a
statistically significant and positive sign on both “Medicaid/SCHIP” and the difference
between “Medicaid/SCHIP” and “Old Medicaid”.

4. RESULTS
Descriptive Analysis of Characteristics of Person-months in Private Insurance Spells
Figure 1 displays the means, in percentage terms, of selected programmatic
design features for low-income children in private insurance spells. The descriptive
statistics (means and standard deviations) of all explanatory variables are presented in
Tables 3. As shown in the table (and also in Figure 1), approximately 28 percent of the
person-months in private coverage spells were months in which the child was
Medicaid/SCHIP-eligible as opposed to only roughly 13 percent of the person-months in
private coverage spells were eligible for pre-SCHIP Medicaid. These demonstrate some
potential for crowd-out in the SCHIP program. Effectively, they indicate that a child
experiencing a person-month of private coverage was more likely to be eligible for
Medicaid/SCHIP coverage than a child experiencing a person-month of public coverage.
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In terms of the administrative models adopted by states’ public insurance
programs, about 52 percent of the person-months in private coverage were ones in which
the child lived in a state that established a new SCHIP program as well as expanded its
existing Medicaid program, that is, a mixed approach to expanding public insurance. On
the other hand, 26 percents of the person-months were in states that only established new
stand-alone SCHIP programs. These statistics might be indicative of some administrative
barriers (aimed at curbing crowd-out of private insurance) imposed by stand-alone
SCHIP programs, which tend to limit enrollment of children. One of the administrative
barriers commonly adopted by states is the imposition of waiting periods, which requires
that children have a lapse of coverage prior to enrollment in SCHIP. About 39 percent of
the person-months in private coverage were ones in which the child lived in a state that
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Figure 1: Distribution of Person-Months, by Programmatic
Features
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imposed a waiting period of five months or less, while approximately 27 percent of the
Table 3: Characteristics of Person-months in Private Insurance Coverage Spells:
Full Analytic Sample
Variable
Contextual Factors
Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility
Old Medicaid eligibility
Separate SCHIP program
Mixed Medicaid/ SCHIP expansion
5-month waiting time or less
Greater than 5-month waiting time
Income disregards
State unemployment rate
Retail-service employment ratio
Medicaid/SCHIP effective 1997
Parent/Family Factors
Mom works fulltime
Mom works part-time
Mom works: other
Not a high school graduate
Some college
College graduate
Graduate education
Family stability

Mean (N=107,468)

Standard Deviation

0.2767
0.1292
0.2601
0.5238
0.3907
0.2727
0.5616
5.8739
0.7413
0.1733

0.4474
0.3354
0.4387
0.4994
0.4879
0.4454
0.4962
1.5821
0.0432
0.3785

0.5070
0.1789
0.0266
0.0856
0.3721
0.1657
0.0473
29.7328

0.5000
0.3833
0.1609
0.2797
0.4834
0.3718
0.2124
13.6508
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Income-poverty ratio
AFDC receipts
Number of children under 18
Resides in Northeast
Resides in Midwest
Resides in West
Individual/Child Characteristics
Poor health status
Black
Hispanic
Other minority
Child older than 5 years
Duration_1-3 months
Duration_4-6 months
Duration_7-9 months
Seam month

238.9688
0.0008
2.3304
0.1635
0.2742
0.2170

114.0530
0.0278
1.2021
0.3698
0.4461
0.4122

0.0153
0.1211
0.1069
0.0417
0.7574
0.0400
0.0327
0.0605
0.2503

0.1228
0.3262
0.3090
0.2000
0.4287
0.1959
0.1779
0.2384
0.4332

Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation, 2001 Longitudinal Panel.
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person-months were in states having six or more months of waiting period before a child
previously covered by private insurance can be enrolled in SCHIP. Again, these indicate
an increased opportunity for the displacement of private insurance by SCHIP, especially
if parent can afford to have their children experience a short-term uninsured period.

Regressions Results of Transitions from Private Insurance Coverage
Estimated parameters were obtained from the multilevel models using the logit
link discussed in Section 3. The results of insurance transitions of sampled children from
private insurance coverage to public insurance and to becoming uninsured are presented
in Table 4. The positive sign of the coefficient on imputed “Medicaid/SCHIP” eligibility
indicates that low-income children who were made eligible for the post-1996
Medicaid/SCHIP expansion were more likely to make transitions from private to public
insurance, relative to children ineligible due to high family income. This suggests that the
enhanced Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility appears to encourage movements of newly eligible
low income children from private to public insurance. The coefficient on this variable is,
however, not statistically significant, indicating that the displacement of private
insurance, that is, crowd-out may not be present. On the other hand, the coefficients on
imputed pre-SCHIP (“Old Medicaid”) eligibility for both models of transitions from
private insurance are positive and statistically significant. These results imply that
privately insured children who are eligible for pre-SCHIP Medicaid coverage, relative to
other children, are more likely to make transitions to public programs or to become
uninsured.
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Table 4: Multilevel Logit Models of Transitions from Private Insurance: Full
Analytic Sample
Variable

Estimated
Coefficient
(.) Std Error
Intercept
Contextual Factors
Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility
Old Medicaid eligibility
Separate SCHIP program
Mixed Medicaid/ SCHIP expansion
5-month waiting time or less
Greater than 5-month waiting time
Income disregards
State unemployment rate
Retail-service employment ratio
Medicaid/SCHIP effective 1997
Parent/Family Factors
Mom works fulltime
Mom works part-time
Mom works: other
Not a high school graduate
Some college
College graduate
Graduate education

Private-Uninsured
Transitions

PrivateMedicaid/SCHIP
Transitions
t-Value

Estimated
Coefficient
(.) Std Error

t-Value

-4.9768***
(1.5389)

-3.23

-33.9161
(77.3814)

-0.44

0.2656
(0.1943)
0.6349***
(0.2112)
-0.7105**
(0.3025)
-0.6020**
(0.2649)
-0.1092
(0.2609)
0.2587
(0.2738)
-0.1414
(0.2406)
0.1228***
(0.0359)
-1.1398
(2.0005)
-0.3385
(0.2480)

1.37

-0.4970***
(0.1011)
-0.1933
(0.1244)
0.6840***
(0.1915)
0.5374***
(0.1244)
-0.2934***
(0.1027)
-0.2260*
(0.1320)
0.1219
(0.1934)

3.01
-2.35
-2.27
-0.42
0.94
-0.59
3.42
-0.57
-1.36

-4.92
-1.55
3.57
4.32
-2.86
-1.71
0.63

0.1260
(0.2105)
0.5862***
(0.2058)
-0.7011**
(0.3522)
0.1072
(0.4063)
0.6207**
(0.2895)
-0.0654
(0.3418)
-0.0837
(0.3541)
0.1401***
(0.0142)
14.5664***
(1.5305)
0.7858**
(0.3340)
0.0009
(0.0404)
0.1782***
(0.0490)
0.3904***
(0.0931)
0.2847***
(0.0549)
0.0039
(0.0377)
-0.4326***
(0.0548)
-0.0096
(0.0815)

0.60
2.85
-1.99
0.26
2.14
-0.19
-0.24
9.84
9.52
2.35

0.02
3.64
4.19
5.18
0.10
-7.90
-0.12

Continued on next page
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Table 4: Continued
Variable

PrivateMedicaid/SCHIP
Transitions
Estimated
Coefficient
(.) Std Error

Family stability
Income-poverty ratio
AFDC receipts
Number of children under 18
Resides in Northeast
Resides in Midwest
Resides in West
Individual/Child Characteristics
Poor health status
Black
Hispanic
Other minority
Child older than 5 years
Duration_1-3 months
Duration_4-6 months
Duration_7-9 months
Seam month

LLR
AIC
Person Months (N)
*** Significant at the 1 percent level
**Significant at the 5 percent level
*Significant at the 10 percent level

Private-Uninsured
Transitions
t-Value

-0.0189***
(0.0027)
-0.0033***
(0.0007)
0.9053**
(0.4384)
-0.0476
(0.0310)
0.0885
(0.3682)
-0.1563
(0.2626)
0.1162
(0.3133)

-6.99

0.6869***
(0.2201)
0.3916***
(0.1210)
0.3401***
(0.1298)
0.9565***
(0.1594)
-0.0734
(0.0939)
-0.7480***
(0.2226)
2.0728***
(0.0975)
0.1010
(0.1320)
2.6880***
(0.1028)

3.12

1016970
1016982
108,113
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-4.64
2.07
-1.53
0.24
-0.60
0.37

3.24
2.62
6.00
-0.78
-3.36
21.27
0.77
26.16

Estimated
Coefficient
(.) Std Error

t-Value

-0.0154***
(0.0011)
-0.0007***
(0.0002)
2.3389***
(0.2442)
-0.0427***
(0.0130)
-1.1505*
(0.6454)
-0.3138
(0.4876)
-0.3314
(0.4504)

-14.37

-0.2975**
(0.1377)
0.0480
(0.0506)
0.2003***
(0.0507)
0.3265***
(0.0742)
0.0642*
(0.0386)
19.3634
(77.3717)
-3.2119***
(0.2482)
1.6205***
(0.0426)
-0.4342***
(0.0575)

-2.16

2033239
2033253
108,584

-3.18
9.58
-3.29
-1.78
-0.64
-0.74

0.95
3.95
4.40
1.66
0.25
-12.94
38.07
-7.55

As expected, the negative signs associated with the “Separate SCHIP Program” variable,
for both models of transitions, suggest that children who live in states that established
new stand-alone SCHIP programs, relative to states that chose to expand their existing
Medicaid programs, on average, are less likely to make transitions from private insurance
to Medicaid/SCHIP coverage or to becoming uninsured, all else constant. Converting the
logit estimates to odds ratio, this result implies that children living in states that
established new stand-alone SCHIP programs, on average, are approximately 51 percent
(0.4914 = e-0.7105; 0.4914-1 = -0.5086) less likely to switch from private coverage to
Medicaid/SCHIP, compared to children living in states that chose to expand their existing
Medicaid programs.
Similarly, the odds ratio of transitions from private insurance to becoming
uninsured is 1.4222 (e-0.7011). Therefore, the result implies that living in states that
established new stand-alone SCHIP programs, on average, is approximately 42 percent
(1.4222-1 = 0.4222) more likely to switch from private coverage to becoming uninsured,
relative to children living in states that chose to expand their existing Medicaid programs.
The negative sign on the coefficient of the variable measuring the administrative model
of mixed approach to public program expansions, relative to expanding existing Medicaid
programs, also indicates a similar effect on transitions from private to public insurance:
children living in a state that adopted a mixed approach to its public program expansion,
on average, is roughly 45 percent (0.5477 = e-0.6020; 0.5477-1 = -0.4523) less likely to
switch from private coverage to Medicaid/SCHIP, compared to children living in a
representative state that chose to expand its existing Medicaid program. These results
might be an indication that establishing new stand-alone SCHIP programs or adopting the
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mixed strategy to expand public programs, compared with expansion of existing
Medicaid programs, are more protective of private insurance, but might be less generous
regarding the take-up of public insurance. This implies that either establishing new standalone SCHIP programs or adopting a mixed approach to expansions and expanding
existing Medicaid programs did differ in their effects on both private coverage and public
insurance take-up.
The signs on the variables measuring lengths of waiting period that some states
impose on children that were previously privately insured children are mixed and not
statistically significant for the model of transitions from private to public insurance.
However, the coefficient on the variable representing waiting periods of five months or
less is positive and statistically significant for the model of transitions from private
insurance to becoming uninsured. In terms of odds ratio, the logit estimate indicates that a
child that lived in a state that imposed a waiting period of one to five months, on average,
is approximately 86 percent (1.8602 = e0.6207; 1.8602-1 = 0.8602) more likely to make at
least one transition from private coverage to becoming uninsured, relative to a child
living in a state that did not have waiting period requirements.
Expectedly, results also show that variables measuring states unemployment, state
occupational mix, parent’s employment status and educational attainment, family
stability, and a child’s racial affiliation are likely to affect transitions from private
coverage to either public insurance or becoming uninsured. The mostly positive signs on
the duration variables that measure the length of time of private insurance coverage
before making transitions to either public coverage or being uninsured suggest that the
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longer a child remains in private coverage, on average, the less likely the child is to
switch to public coverage or to become uninsured. 5

Estimating Crowd-Out Effect of Medicaid/SCHIP Eligibility on Private Insurance
Table 5 presents the difference-in-differences estimates, which approximate net
differences between SCHIP eligible and pre-SCHIP eligible children regarding health
insurance transitions as a result of Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility expansion. As previously
discussed, the coefficient on the variable that represents imputed Medicaid/SCHIP
eligibility, for the two estimated models, approximates the difference in health insurance
transitions between the target group of sampled children, that is, those who were
potentially eligible for the expanded public insurance program, and the comparison
group, that is, ineligible children due to having too high family income levels. In order to
capture only transitions in health insurance attributable to the Medicaid/SCHIP
eligibility, it is important to net out the effect of other market factors. Following an
approach similar to that of Blumberg, Dubay, and Norton (2000) and Dubay and
Blumberg (2006), I used a difference-in-differences estimation framework that serves to
capture health insurance transitions while isolating relevant external factors. The
differences in the coefficients on the “Medicaid/SCHIP” minus “Old Medicaid”, for the
regression models, therefore give the net changes, which approximate the effect of
Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility on the displacement of private insurance. These estimates, as
presented in column 2 of Table 5, provide further tests of the effect of the post-1996
Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility expansion on transitions from private insurance.

5

Tables of descriptive statistics and regression results for samples stratified by family income are presented
in the Appendix.
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Table 5: Summary Table of Difference-in-Differences Hypothesis Tests for
Possible Displacement of Private Insurance Coverage
Model of Transitions

Private-to-Public
Private-to-Uninsured

Medicaid/SCHIP minus
Ineligible
1
Estimate
t-value
(.) Std Err
0.2656
1.3700
(0.1943)
0.126
0.6000
(0.2105)

Medicaid/SCHIP Eligible
minus Old Medicaid Eligible
2
Estimate
t-value
(.) Std Err
-0.3693*
-1.7017
(0.2170)
-0.4602
-1.6177
(0.2845)

*** Significant at the 1 percent level
**Significant at the 5 percent level
* Significant at the 10 percent level

Therefore, if there was crowd-out during the period under analysis, for both
models predicting the odds of transitions from private insurance, on Table 5, one would
expect a statistically significant and positive signs on the variable representing the
imputed Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility and also on the differences between
“Medicaid/SCHIP” and “Old Medicaid” eligibility.
The sign on the coefficient of the variable representing the imputed
Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility is positive. The direction of effect indicates that the post1996 Medicaid/SCHIP expansion increases the likelihood of eligible low-income
children, relative to ineligible ones, to make transitions from private to public insurance.
The coefficient on this variable is, however, not statistically significant. However, the
coefficient measuring the difference between “Medicaid/SCHIP” and “Old Medicaid”
eligibility is negative but is weakly, statistically significant. This indicates that the
enhanced Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility is likely to decrease the odds of making transitions
from private coverage to public insurance decreases, all else constant.
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The results from the models described above, based on the signs on the
coefficients measuring the differences between “Medicaid/SCHIP” and “Old Medicaid”
eligibility are not indicative of crowd-out. Rather, the results suggest that the post-1996
Medicaid/SCHIP expansions, relative to pre-SCHIP expansions (or “Old Medicaid”),
might have resulted in decreased movements of low-income children from private to
public insurance. Although, the enhanced SCHIP eligibility expansion might have
increased take-up rates of public insurance among eligible low-income children, the
effectiveness of anti crowd-out measures could have slowed the rate of displacement of
private coverage by public insurance. These findings might be indirectly due to the
choice of administrative models that states adopted in expanding their public insurance
programs. For example, regression results indicate that establishing new stand-alone
SCHIP programs or adopting the mixed strategy to expand public programs, compared
with expansion of existing Medicaid programs, are more protective of private insurance,
but might be less effective regarding the take-up of public insurance. These findings
could be due to the effectiveness of administrative models that tend to curb crowd-out.
For example, states that established new stand-alone SCHIP programs have great latitude
to incorporate anti crowd-out measures such as imposing waiting periods, enrollment
caps, or premiums on participants. For instance, Kenny, et al. (2006) concluded the
premium increases in SCHIP resulted in lower caseloads and/or earlier disenrollment
from the programs in the states of Kansas, Kentucky, and New Hampshire.
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5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In this study, I took advantage of the longitudinal formation of the SIPP data,
using a combination of event history and multilevel modeling technique to (a) examine
the effects of the form of Medicaid/SCHIP expansion and waiting periods on transitions
from private insurance coverage; and (b) to evaluate whether the post-1996
Medicaid/SCHIP expansion crowds out private insurance coverage among low-income
children in the United States, while controlling for a robust array of individual, family,
and state-level factors.
Findings from this study suggest that the expanded eligibility of SCHIP has not
had adverse effects on private insurance coverage: results do not suggest that the
expanded SCHIP eligibility has increased the likelihood of transitions from private to
public coverage among low income children. There is, therefore, no evidence of crowdout of private insurance as a result of the Medicaid/SCHIP expansion during the period
under study. This result is somewhat similar to that of Dubay and Blumberg (2006).
Using the 1996 SIPP panel, they concluded that there was no evidence that SCHIP
expansion caused significant movements of low income children from private to public
coverage.
The administrative models adopted by states to expand their public programs can
have significant impacts on transitions from private insurance or uninsurance and, by
extension, on take-up of public insurance. One major decision states faced in the SCHIP
program was whether they would create a new, stand-alone program or whether they
would simply expand the old Medicaid program. The latter had certain advantages of
simplicity, at the cost of retaining the potential social stigma and other negative aspects
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of Medicaid. The former gave states the advantage of establishing new rules that could
limit crowd-out and reduce stigma, but there exist the problems of putting a new program
in place such as startup cost and creating awareness among intended beneficiaries.
Results indicate that children who live in states that established new stand-alone
SCHIP programs, relative to states that chose to expand their existing Medicaid
programs, on average, are approximately 51 percent less likely to make transitions from
private insurance to Medicaid/SCHIP coverage, all else constant. The administrative
model of mixed approach to public program expansions, relative to expanding existing
Medicaid programs, is also indicated to have a similar effect on transitions from private
to public insurance. Results further imply that privately insured children living in states
that established new stand-alone SCHIP programs, on average, are approximately 42
percent more likely to become uninsured, relative to similar children living in states that
chose to expand their existing Medicaid programs. Put together, these results suggest that
establishing new stand-alone SCHIP programs or adopting the mixed strategy to expand
public programs, compared with the expansion of existing Medicaid programs, are more
protective of private insurance, but might be less generous regarding the take-up of public
insurance. This implies that either establishing new stand-alone SCHIP programs or
adopting a mixed approach to expansions and expanding existing Medicaid programs did
differ in their effects on both private coverage and public insurance take-up.
These findings could be due to the effectiveness of anti crowd-out measures, such
as waiting periods, that are aimed at discouraging unnecessary movements of children
from private to public insurance. Budgetary constraints facing Medicaid/SCHIP programs
could have also played a role in observed results. These anti-crow-out measures can
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potentially discourage parents from enrolling their potentially eligible children in such
stand-alone SCHIP programs, whether they are moving from either private coverage or
uninsured status. These administrative “roadblocks” may offset the effects of reduced
stigma enough to decrease enrollment in the new separate SCHIP programs. It should be
noted that much of the decreases in private insurance coverage that have been recently
observed might be partly due to economic slowdown, which makes private insurance less
affordable, especially to the low income population through diminished employment
opportunities for parents, which adversely affected opportunities for employer-provided
insurance coverage for families.
Findings also indicate that children living in a state that imposed a waiting period
of one to five months, on average, are more likely to make transitions from private
coverage to becoming uninsured, relative to children living in a state that did not have
waiting period requirements. This result suggests that shorter waiting periods might not
discourage parents from having their children uninsured for some time before being
enrolled in Medicaid/SCHIP. It should be noted that some states required that individuals
have a lapse of coverage or waiting period prior to SCHIP enrollment, which might have
resulted in parents declining private coverage for a child (especially a seemingly healthy
child) and experiencing a short-term uninsured period, in expectation of future SCHIP
coverage.
The above result regarding the effect of waiting period requirements on
transitions from private coverage is somewhat consistent with those of the effects of
forms of public program expansion discussed above. For example, when put together, the
combined results might suggest that a child that lived in a state that both established a
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new stand-alone SCHIP program and imposed a waiting period, relative to a state that
chose to expand its existing Medicaid program with no waiting period requirements, on
average, is less likely to switch from private coverage to public insurance. Therefore, if
there are states experiencing proven cases of crowd-out, then it might be prudent for such
states to adopt the strategy of establishing a new stand-alone SCHIP program or
strengthening an already existing SCHIP program that imposes a waiting period longer
than five months. If this strategy is to be adopted, precautions should be taken to avoid
denying public insurance coverage to SCHIP-eligible children. It is note worthy to add
that such an approach would come with some administrative costs.
There are some limitations pertaining to the data and analysis that warrant caution
against drawing definitive conclusions from the results as discussed above. A potential
caveat to the results is that the imputed eligibility variable used in this study does not
incorporate every state rule concerning expanded Medicaid/SCHIP. Some of these stem
from a lack of precise variable measurements based on information that is available in the
SIPP data set. For example, SCHIP coverage is not clearly identified in the SIPP data, a
situation that could potentially lead to some measurement errors. Also, public program
eligibility is imputed, which is hypothetical in nature as it is practically impossible to
incorporate all exiting state rules used in determining eligibility. For instance, to calculate
the amount of income disregards, information is needed on exact income deductions such
as amount of child support received, work and child care expenses. However, SIPP does
not provide information on the actual amount of child care expense.
In spite of the limitations imposed by a lack of some information in the SIPP data
set, this study contributes to literature by addressing gaps in the methodological approach
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generally used in examining the dynamics of health insurance by combining both event
history and multi-level modeling approaches thereby incorporating the timing of health
insurance transitions, as well as adjusting for clustering of children within the states
where they resided. Also, this paper enhances our understanding of the impact of
different administrative models of states’ SCHIP/Medicaid programs on private and
public coverage as well as the uninsured. Results from this study could inform health
policy debates on how states might modify their Medicaid/SCHIP programs’ policy
design features to (i) reduce the number of uninsured individuals, especially among the
low-income population; and (ii) reduce crowd-out of private insurance if necessary; (iii)
more effectively target the neediest populations. The combination of (i) to (iii) can lead to
effective and efficient reductions in the number of uninsured individuals as well as
increased coverage and retention rates in private insurance. These efforts could
potentially result in improved access to health care, especially among low-income
populations, without necessarily increasing financial burdens on the taxpayer.
Given the findings emanating from this study, there should be more in-depth
study of public insurance program design features that directly affect take-up of public
insurance, that is, a more detailed study of outreach efforts by states targeting uninsured
low-income individuals. More detailed measures of personal, family, insurance coverage,
and programmatic features (or policy interventions) should be developed to assess their
effects on retention rates in private insurance as well as take-up rates of public insurance.
Results from the estimated models suggest that the mixed public and private markets in
insurance coverage for children continues to be a difficult balancing act for policymakers,
as they try to improve insurance coverage without spending public dollars unnecessarily.
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APPENDIX
Table 1A: Characteristics of Person-months in Private Insurance Coverage Spells:
Family Income between 200 and 350 Percent of the Federal Poverty Level
Variable
Contextual Factors
Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility
Old Medicaid eligibility
Separate SCHIP program
Mixed Medicaid/ SCHIP expansion
5-month waiting time or less
Greater than 5-month waiting time
Income disregards
State unemployment rate
Retail-service employment ratio
Medicaid/SCHIP effective 1997
Parent/Family Factors
Mom works fulltime
Mom works part-time
Mom works: other
Not a high school graduate
Some college
College graduate
Graduate education
Family stability
Income-poverty ratio
AFDC receipts
Number of children under 18
Resides in Northeast
Resides in Midwest
Resides in West
Individual/Child Characteristics
Poor health status
Black
Hispanic
Other minority
Child older than 5 years
Duration_1-3 months
Duration_4-6 months
Duration_7-9 months
Seam month

Mean (N=75,055)

Standard Deviation

0.1894
0.0562
0.2567
0.5237
0.3954
0.2714
0.5590
5.8795
0.7413
0.1785

0.3919
0.2302
0.4368
0.4994
0.4889
0.4447
0.4965
1.6019
0.0422
0.3829

0.5383
0.1888
0.0287
0.0595
0.3908
0.1848
0.0562
31.0337
276.9072
0.0001
2.2177
0.1712
0.2985
0.2231

0.4985
0.3913
0.1670
0.2366
0.4879
0.3881
0.2303
12.4147
104.4602
0.0089
1.0385
0.3767
0.4576
0.4163

0.0135
0.1050
0.0928
0.0386
0.7594
0.0271
0.0238
0.0545
0.2501

0.1152
0.3066
0.2901
0.1927
0.4275
0.1624
0.1525
0.2270
0.4331

Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation, 2001 Longitudinal Panel.
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Table 1B: Multilevel Logit Models of Transitions from Private Insurance: Family
Income between 200 and 350 Percent of the Federal Poverty Level
Variable

Intercept
Contextual Factors
Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility
Old Medicaid eligibility
Separate SCHIP program
Mixed Medicaid/ SCHIP expansion
5-month waiting time or less
Greater than 5-month waiting time
Income disregards
State unemployment rate
Retail-service employment ratio
Medicaid/SCHIP effective 1997
Parent/Family Factors
Mom works fulltime
Mom works part-time
Mom works: other
Not a high school graduate
Some college
College graduate
Graduate education

PrivateUninsured
Transitions

PrivateMedicaid/SCHIP
Transitions
Estimated
Coefficient
(.) Std Error

t-Value

Estimated
Coefficient
(.) Std Error

t-Value

-5.7873**
(2.2356)

-2.59

-35.2601
(93.7787)

-0.38

0.4646
(0.3055)
0.8584***
(0.2980)
-0.5054
(0.3768)
-0.2147
(0.4085)
-0.3893
(0.3436)
0.2162
(0.3672)
-0.5276*
(0.3157)
0.0444
(0.0591)
-0.1768
(2.8451)
-0.5553*
(0.3131)

1.52

-0.5523***
(0.1764)
0.0011
(0.2068)
0.5622*
(0.3200)
0.6980***
(0.2255)
-0.2400
(0.1685)
-0.3587
(0.2244)
0.0301
(0.2904)

2.88
-1.34
-0.53
-1.13
0.59
-1.67
0.75
-0.06
-1.77

-3.13
0.01
1.76
3.09
-1.42
-1.60
0.10

0.2755
(0.2771)
0.2685
(0.2900)
-0.1388
(0.4146)
0.2047
(0.4644)
0.7835**
(0.3206)
-0.0912
(0.3867)
-0.5321
(0.3663)
0.0875***
(0.0201)
16.4448***
(1.9620)
1.0439***
(0.3704)
0.0533
(0.0571)
0.3464***
(0.0673)
-0.1897
(0.1487)
0.2727***
(0.0859)
0.0069
(0.0522)
-0.3356***
(0.0706)
-0.0312
(0.0984)

0.99
0.93
-0.33
0.44
2.44
-0.24
-1.45
4.34
8.38
2.82

0.93
5.15
-1.28
3.17
0.13
-4.75
-0.32

Continued on next page
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Table 1B: Continued
Variable

Estimated
Coefficient
(.) Std Error
Family stability
Income-poverty ratio
AFDC receipts
Number of children under 18
Resides in Northeast
Resides in Midwest
Resides in West
Individual/Child Characteristics
Poor health status
Black
Hispanic
Other minority
Child older than 5 years
Duration_1-3 months
Duration_4-6 months
Duration_7-9 months
Seam month

LLR
AIC
Person Months (N)
*** Significant at the 1 percent level
**Significant at the 5 percent level
*Significant at the 10 percent level

PrivateUninsured
Transitions

PrivateMedicaid/SCHIP
Transitions

-0.0301***
(0.0045)
-0.0004
(0.0008)
-17.4131
(17034.0000)
-0.1999***
(0.0669)
-0.1848
(0.4281)
-0.1125
(0.3498)
0.0356
(0.3806)
1.0925***
(0.3222)
0.5907***
(0.2132)
0.6793***
(0.2030)
0.8042***
(0.2954)
0.0052
(0.1638)
-0.2823
(0.3561)
1.6714***
(0.1916)
-0.0741
(0.2256)
2.7333***
(0.1760)
750848
750860
32,462
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t-Value

Estimated
Coefficient
(.) Std Error

t-Value

-6.67

-0.0185
(0.0015)
0.0002
(0.0002)
-18.5972
(8337.3800)
0.0098
(0.0213)
-1.3574**
(0.6224)
-0.1258
(0.4724)
-0.5616
(0.4474)

-12.13

-0.46
0.00
-2.99
-0.43
-0.32
0.09

3.39
2.77
3.35
2.72
0.03
-0.79
8.72
-0.33
15.53

0.3529**
(0.1598)
-0.2069**
(0.0778)
0.1341*
(0.0712)
0.1631
(0.1119)
0.0888*
(0.0536)
-3.9931***
(0.6372)
1.7377***
(0.0612)
-0.7078***
(0.0874)
19.1041
(93.7659)
1425817
1425831
75,653

0.76
0.00
0.46
-2.18
-0.27
-1.26

2.21
-2.66
1.88
1.46
1.66
-6.27
28.39
-8.10
0.20

Table 2A: Characteristics of Person-months in Private Insurance Coverage Spells:
Family Income Less than 200 Percent of the Federal Poverty Level
Variable
Contextual Factors
Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility
Old Medicaid eligibility
Separate SCHIP program
Mixed Medicaid/ SCHIP expansion
5-month waiting time or less
Greater than 5-month waiting time
Income disregards
State unemployment rate
Retail-service employment ratio
Medicaid/SCHIP effective 1997
Parent/Family Factors
Mom works fulltime
Mom works part-time
Mom works: other
Not a high school graduate
Some college
College graduate
Graduate education
Family stability
Income-poverty ratio
AFDC receipts
Number of children under 18
Resides in Northeast
Resides in Midwest
Resides in West
Individual/Child Characteristics
Poor health status
Black
Hispanic
Other minority
Child older than 5 years
Duration_1-3 months
Duration_4-6 months
Duration_7-9 months
Seam month

Mean (N=31,949)

Standard Deviation

0.4790
0.3014
0.2685
0.5222
0.3812
0.2732
0.5663
5.8596
0.7409
0.1629

0.4996
0.4589
0.4432
0.4995
0.4857
0.4456
0.4956
1.5249
0.0449
0.3693

0.4319
0.1573
0.0220
0.1449
0.3271
0.1231
0.0265
26.7524
150.3089
0.0024
2.5997
0.1475
0.2177
0.2009

0.4953
0.3640
0.1467
0.3520
0.4692
0.3286
0.1607
15.7291
79.9633
0.0490
1.4879
0.3547
0.4127
0.4007

0.0194
0.1560
0.1391
0.0482
0.7504
0.0701
0.0536
0.0747
0.2508

0.1379
0.3629
0.3460
0.2142
0.4328
0.2553
0.2253
0.2629
0.4335

Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation, 2001 Longitudinal Panel.
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Table2B: Multilevel Logit Models of Transitions from Private Insurance: Family
Income Less than 200 Percent of the Federal Poverty Level
Variable

Estimated
Coefficient
(.) Std Error
Intercept
Contextual Factors
Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility
Old Medicaid eligibility
Separate SCHIP program
Mixed Medicaid/ SCHIP expansion
5-month waiting time or less
Greater than 5-month waiting time
Income disregards
State unemployment rate
Retail-service employment ratio
Medicaid/SCHIP effective 1997
Parent/Family Factors
Mom works fulltime
Mom works part-time
Mom works: other
Not a high school graduate
Some college
College graduate
Graduate education

PrivateUninsured
Transitions

PrivateMedicaid/SCHIP
Transitions
t-Value

Estimated
Coefficient
(.) Std Error

t-Value

-3.4993
(2.2689)

-1.54

-29.4866
(129.8700)

-0.23

-0.3173
(0.2564)
0.1594
(0.2709)
-0.7429*
(0.4152)
-0.8025**
(0.3855)
0.2638
(0.3997)
0.1649
(0.4005)
0.0716
(0.3449)
0.1499***
(0.0474)
-3.1955
(2.9924)
-0.1695
(0.3701)

-1.24

-0.3827***
(0.1303)
-0.2762
(0.1681)
0.9831***
(0.2541)
0.5221***
(0.1594)
-0.1568
(0.1386)
-0.0419
(0.1772)
0.3451
(0.3026)

-2.94

0.59
-1.79
-2.08
0.66
0.41
0.21
3.16
-1.07
-0.46

-1.64
3.87
3.28
-1.13
-0.24
1.14

-0.2864
(0.3853)
-0.2241
(0.3945)
-1.2766*
(0.7024)
0.7455
(0.7087)
0.2303
(0.5465)
0.3442
(0.6184)
0.0434
(0.6256)
0.1750***
(0.0195)
8.8865***
(2.2736)
-0.0445
(0.6430)
0.0838
(0.0579)
0.0444
(0.0756)
0.9449***
(0.1272)
0.3118***
(0.0727)
0.0377
(0.0570)
-0.6758***
(0.0967)
-0.4664**
(0.1914)

-0.74
-0.57
-1.82
1.05
0.42
0.56
0.07
8.97
3.91
-0.07

1.45
0.59
7.43
4.29
0.66
-6.99
-2.44

Continued on next page
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Table 2B: Continued
Variable

Estimated
Coefficient
(.) Std Error
Family stability
Income-poverty ratio
AFDC receipts
Number of children under 18
Resides in Northeast
Resides in Midwest
Resides in West
Individual/Child Characteristics
Poor health status
Black
Hispanic
Other minority
Child older than 5 years
Duration_1-3 months
Duration_4-6 months
Duration_7-9 months
Seam month

LLR
AIC
Person Months (N)
*** Significant at the 1 percent level
**Significant at the 5 percent level
*Significant at the 10 percent level

PrivateUninsured
Transitions

PrivateMedicaid/SCHIP
Transitions

-0.0103***
(0.0036)
-0.0026**
(0.0012)
1.1055**
(0.4815)
-0.0511
(0.0378)
0.2508
(0.5325)
-0.0464
(0.4166)
0.2674
(0.4636)
0.3423
(0.3048)
0.2161
(0.1542)
0.2090
(0.1752)
0.9992***
(0.2142)
-0.1114
(0.1221)
-1.1166***
(0.2868)
2.0470***
(0.1218)
0.1047
(0.1678)
2.6767***
(0.1294)
278127
278141
32,393
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t-Value

-2.85
-2.24
2.30
-1.35
0.47
-0.11
0.58

1.12
1.40
1.19
4.66
-0.91
-3.89
16.81
0.62
20.68

Estimated
Coefficient
(.) Std Error
-0.0105***
(0.0016)
-0.0049***
(0.0006)
2.3819***
(0.2435)
-0.0834***
(0.0171)
-0.4735
(1.1978)
-0.8189
(0.9076)
0.6500
(0.8832)
-1.4317***
(0.3101)
0.3469***
(0.0690)
0.3457***
(0.0727)
0.3761***
(0.1059)
-0.0108
(0.0563)
-3.2031***
(0.2552)
1.3812***
(0.0601)
-0.3656***
(0.0753)
19.8527
(129.8600)
612034
612048
32,462

t-Value

-6.73
-8.68
9.78
-4.87
-0.40
-0.90
0.74

-4.62
5.03
4.76
3.55
-0.19
-12.55
22.98
-4.86
0.15

